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Abstract
This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country, using a
novel two-good, two-province, successive-oligopoly heterogeneous-product Bertrand compe-
tition model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product through
exclusive retailers located in both provinces. The producer-retailer setup allows provincial
governments to raise taxes on upstream and downstream transactions. First, we analyze
tax incidence results and emphasize the importance of the degree of downstream competi-
tion on the tax shifting. Second, we solve a non-cooperative revenue maximization problem
and study the properties of the equilibrium taxes. We characterize the solution: either all
tax rates are positive or one province drops one tax rate. This way, the full-tax solution
dominates upstream and downstream taxation. Also, the non-cooperative solution implies
over-taxation when compared with the cooperative solution.
Este paper analiza impuestos en mu´ltiples etapas recaudados por provincias en un
pa´ıs federal, utilizando un modelo novedoso de competencia en dos segmentos productor-
minorista a la Bertrand con productos diferenciados, donde cada productor esta´ ubicado en
una provincia y vende en todo el pa´ıs a trave´s de sus distribuidores. Este modelo genera
la posibilidad de que las provincias recauden en las dos etapas de transacciones. En primer
lugar, se obtienen resultados de incidencia, enfatizando la importancia del grado de difer-
enciacio´n sobre la traslacio´n. En segundo lugar, se resuelve el problema de maximizacio´n
de recaudacio´n en un contexto no cooperativo y se estudian las propiedades de las al´ıcuotas
de equilibrio: las provincias utilizan todas las al´ıcuotas o una de ellas descarta so´lo una
al´ıcuota. La solucio´n no cooperativa domina (en te´rminos de recaudacio´n) a los casos de
impuestos al productor o a las ventas minoristas. Por otro lado, esta solucio´n se caracteriza
por imposicio´n excesiva (respecto de un caso cooperativo).
Keywords: local indirect taxation, multistage taxes, tax icidence, tax competition.
JEL Codes: H71, H21, H22.
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Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments:
Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation
1 Introduction
General taxes on goods and services (TGS) are an important source of fiscal revenue. They
are top–of–the–list within indirect taxes, and are typically classified into value-added –or
consumption– taxes, sales taxes, multi-stage cumulative taxes, excises, taxes on trade,
etc. (following OECD’s classification). Other important sources of revenue are taxes on
income (direct taxation on corporate or personal income or earnings) and property (direct
taxation on wealth).
When the power to raise revenues is vested on a centralized level, fiscal authorities
prefer VAT or sales taxes over multi-stage taxes. There is a reason for that: multi-
stage taxation creates inefficiency along the value-chain (the so-called “cascade” effect).1
Governments naturally internalize the double-margin effect from multi-stage taxation and
prefer consumption or sales taxes over turnover taxes. In fact, countries that joined the
European Community used to raise some form of turnover taxes, and replaced them for
VAT during the mid-80s (Tait, 1988).
But multi-stage taxes arise as a preferred instrument at provincial levels, although
they are not widespread. There is also a reason for that: provinces may have incentive
to export or import tax bases. For example, in Argentina provincial governments collect
turnover taxes (impuesto sobre los ingresos brutos), which represent –in average– more
than 40 percent (60 percent in some provinces) of provincial resources.2
This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country. We set up
1 The cascade effect has long been studied by the public finance literature. See Friedlaender (1967).
2 We refer the reader to many papers of this tax in Argentina. See, for example, Nu´n˜ez Min˜ana
(1994), Libonatti (1998), Porto, Garriga and Rosales (2014) and the references therein.
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a two-good, two-province, successive-oligopoly heterogeneous-product Bertrand competi-
tion model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product through
exclusive retailers located in both provinces. The producer-retailer setup allows provincial
governments to raise taxes on both upstream and downstream links of the value chain.
With this model, we study tax incidence and solve a taxation problem with provinces that
seek to maximize tax revenues (Leviathan) non-cooperatively. We analyze the properties
of the equilibrium taxes and compare them to specific cases (upstream and downstream
non-cooperative taxation, and cooperative taxation). Although the setup and results ap-
ply to provinces, they extend straightforwardly to countries coordinated within a Union
(such as the European Union or Mercosur), in which governments may export / import
bases to taxes collected at federal level.
The following results are obtained in this paper. First, we study the tax incidence
properties of the model, analyzing changes in producer and retailer prices due to changes
in upstream or downstream tax rates, and showing that these incidence effects depend
crucially on the degree of product differentiation and therefore on the level of (down-
stream and upstream) market power. Second, assuming provinces that maximize tax
revenues (Leviathan) non-cooperatively, we analyze tax rates in equilibrium under differ-
ent scenarios. In the symmetric case (equal market sizes, retail costs and producer costs
for both products) with no competition at the downstream level, we find a double-tax-
rate mark-up result –which mimics the standard producer-retailer relationship obtained
in the industrial organization literature– with upstream rates doubling downstream rates
in equilibrium. As downstream competition gets stronger, provincial governments grad-
ually switch from upstream to downstream taxation, eventually abandoning upstream
taxation completely when products are homogeneous. Different asymmetric configura-
tions of relevant parameters (market size, regional retail costs, producer costs or retail
costs by product) translate in different asymmetries in upstream and downstream taxes
in equilibrium. A general result (proved in separate propositions in the paper) emerges:
if parameters are such that equilibrium exists and products exhibit a certain degree of
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heterogeneity, provinces will choose positive tax rates at both levels (upstream and down-
stream) or at most one of the four tax rates is zero. As in the symmetric case, only
downstream tax rates are positive under product homogeneity, although at different rates
between regions. Third, we obtain a dominance result in terms of provincial tax revenue,
provided goods are heterogeneous: successive taxation raises higher revenues over cases
in which governments are restricted to use either upstream (production) or downstream
(consumption) taxation. Only when products are homogeneous the full taxation and
downstream taxation are revenue-equivalent. This result provides a strong ground for us-
ing successive taxation (over production- or consumption-based taxation) when provincial
governments need to raise resources.3 Finally, we compare full-taxation in a non coopera-
tive setting with a coordinated scenario where provincial governments choose tax rates to
maximize joint revenues and obtain an over-taxation result: if there is a minimum degree
of product differentiation, non-cooperative taxation implies over-taxation, and hence less
revenues, compared with cooperative taxation. Only when products are homogeneous the
non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are revenue-equivalent.
The paper links to different branches of the literature. First, tax incidence under
different market structures has been analyzed extensively in the literature, although not
in a context of (successive) taxation by subnational governments (Bishop, 1968, Anderson,
de Palma and Kreider, 2001, and Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002).
Second, Peitz and Reisinger (2014) study taxation in successive-markets, but they
focus on the per-unit ad-valorem tax mix, whereas this paper analyzes the upstream-
downstream tax mix. Moreover, we define a short-run price competition model with
product differentiation and a pre-set location of producer in different provinces, while
Peitz and Reisinger (2014) study the successive taxation problem in an homogeneous
quantity-competition (Cournot) oligopoly with entry but without geographic concerns.
3 A companion paper studies successive taxation following welfare objectives in a simpler setting.
Under certain configuration of parameters on preferences, market sizes and costs the solution implies
successive taxation.
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Third, there is a link with the literature on origin or destination principles for taxation
(Lockwood 1993, 2001, Keen and Lahiri, 1993, 1998). Keen and Lahiri (1993) focus on
harmonization of destination-based taxes. Keen and Lahiri (1998) focus on welfare con-
sequences of switching between destination and origin principles when (i) both taxes are
fixed, (ii) both taxes are optimized. Keen (1989) and Lockwood (1997) analyze tax har-
monization and Pareto-improving reforms when goods are heterogeneous. Trandel (1994)
focuses on interstate commodity tax. Lockwood (2001) analyzes tax competition under
origin and destination principles, based on consumer price spillover, producer price/terms
of trade spillover and rent spillover, but leaves aside multi-stage taxation.
A fourth link exists with the literature on the distortions generated by taxes imposed
on several levels of the value chain, like the turnover tax (the “cascade effect” mentioned
above). The contribution of this paper is that “the cascade effect” trades off with the
possibility of importing or exporting tax bases, which is relevant at provincial levels.4
Finally, we build a differentiated-product successive-oligopoly model, where we assume
product differentiation using the demand proposed by Deneckeree and Davidson (1985).
The choice of a demand function that captures product differentiation in a simple way
(together with linear costs) allows us to get closed-form solutions for market competition
and tax rates.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a novel competition
model and characterizes the equilibrium prices and quantities at retail and producer levels.
Section 3 studies tax incidence results, with emphasis on the relationship with the degree
of product differentiation and market power. Section 4 solves the full-tax non-cooperative
Leviathan problem, characterizes the solution, and compares it with a scenario where
provincial governments are restricted from using only one instrument. Section 5 explores
4 Das-Gupta (2005) constructs an example where the turnover tax can dominate the VAT under a
successive monopoly in terms of welfare, revenue and output.
5 See Inderst and Valletti (2011) and Reisinger and Schnitzer (2012) regarding modeling upstream-
downstream markets with differentiated products.
5
the cooperative solution and compares it with the non-cooperative case. Finally, Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Assume two producers of goods A and B. Producer A is located in country / province 1,
producer B is located in region / province 2, and they do not re-locate across countries
/ provinces.6 In order to reach consumers, producers sell their products to retailers in
an upstream market. Retailers sell products to consumers in a downstream market. The
structure is as follows.
Producer A (located in region 1) sells products to retailer 1A in region 1 (x1A) and
retailer 2A in region 2 (x2A) at price pA. Total quantity of product A is xA = x1A + x2A.
Likewise, producer B (located in region 2) sells products to retailer 1B in region 1 and
retailer 2B in region 2 at price pB . Total quantity of product B is xB = x1B + x2B.
Therefore, we rule out third-degree (regional) price discrimination. Producers’ marginal
cost is constant and equal to cA and cB, respectively.
Retailers in market i = 1, 2 sell to consumers with demand
xij = ai − pij − γ (pij − pik) (1)
where subscript i is region and j, k correspond to products (either A,B or B,A). We use
a simple demand (1) (as that used by in Deneckeree and Davidson, 1985, to study merger
among firms competing with differentiated products) to characterize the equilibrium based
6 This paper does not analyze location decisions. It may be the case that firms locate in a country or
province following costs or tax advantages (“fiscal benefits”). Once investment decisions are made, there
is a time span –the relevant time throughout this paper– in which production plants stay in the country
/ province.
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on market size (ai) and the degree of market-power linked to product differentiation (γ).
Retailers’ costs are
CTij(xij) = (pj + cij) xij
There are regional / provincial governments that collect sales taxes. They can set
rates on upstream sales (τi) and / or downstream sales (ti) within their jurisdiction. Tax
revenues in provinces 1 and 2 are
R1 = τ1xA + t1 (x1A + x1B) = (τ1 + t1)x1A + t1x1B + τ1x2A
R2 = τ2xB + t2 (x2A + x2B) = (τ2 + t2)x2B + t2x2A + τ2x1B
Revenues are collected on upstream and downstream sales of units produced and sold
within the same province, upstream sales of units produced in the province but sold in
the other province, and downstream sales of units produced in the other province and
sold in the government’s province. With this setup, Section 2.2 characterizes the market
equilibrium upon which the local governments collect taxes.
2.2 Producers and retailers: equilibrium and profits
2.2.1 Retailers equilibrium
Let the subindex ij (ik) stand for product j in province i (product k –substitute to
product j– in province i). Also, let c¯ij = cij + ti + pj . Retailers’ profit is
piij = (pij − c¯ij) [ai − pij − γ(pij − pik)]
Profit maximization and equilibrium at the downstream level lead to the following prices
and quantities
pij =
ai
(2 + γ)
+
(1 + γ) [2(1 + γ)c¯ij + γc¯ik]
(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
(2)
xij =
(1 + γ)(ai − cij − ti − pj)
(2 + γ)
+
γ(1 + γ)2 (cik + pk − cij − pj)
(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
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2.2.2 Producers equilibrium
Producer A’s profit is piA = (pA − τ1 − cA)[x1A + x2A], i.e.,
piA = (pA − τ1 − cA)


(1+γ)(a1−c1A−t1−pA)
(2+γ)
+ γ(1+γ)
2(c1B+pB−c1A−pA)
(2+γ)(2+3γ)
+
(1+γ)(a2−c2A−t2−pA)
(2+γ)
+ γ(1+γ)
2(c2B+pB−c2A−pA)
(2+γ)(2+3γ)


Producer B’s profit is piB = (pB − τ2 − cB)[x1B + x2B], i.e.,
piB = (pB − τ2 − cB)


(1+γ)(a1−c1B−t1−pB)
(2+γ)
+ γ(1+γ)
2(c1A+pA−c1B−pB)
(2+γ)(2+3γ)
+
(1+γ)(a2−c2B−t2−pB)
(2+γ)
+ γ(1+γ)
2(c2A+pA−c2B−pB)
(2+γ)(2+3γ)


Profit maximization and equilibrium at the upstream level leads to the following so-
lution:
pA = ΦA − δ(t1 + t2) + θτ2 + ωτ1 pB = ΦB − δ(t1 + t2) + θτ1 + ωτ2 (3)
x1A = Γ1A − αt1 + βt2 − µτ1 + κτ2 x1B = Γ1B − αt1 + βt2 + κτ1 − µτ2 (4)
x2A = Γ2A + βt1 − αt2 − µτ1 + κτ2 x2B = Γ2B + βt1 − αt2 + κτ1 − µτ2 (5)
p1A = Ψ1A + αt1 − βt2 + ρτ1 + στ2 p1B = Ψ1B + αt1 − βt2 + ρτ2 + στ1 (6)
p2A = Ψ2A + αt2 − βt1 + ρτ1 + στ2 p2B = Ψ2B + αt2 − βt1 + ρτ2 + στ1 (7)
Constants ΦA,ΦB are the no-tax producer prices (from equations (22)-(23) in Appendix
A); Ψ1A,Ψ1B,Ψ2A,Ψ2B are the no-tax retail prices (from equations (24)-(27) in Appendix
A); Γ1A,Γ1B ,Γ2A,Γ2B are the no-tax equilibrium quantities (from equations (28)–(31) in
Appendix A); and (α, β, µ, κ, ρ, σ, δ, θ, ω) are parameters –which depend on γ– defined in
equations (32)-(37). We discuss the assumptions on parameters for an interior solution in
Appendix B.
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3 Incidence analysis
3.1 General results
Tax incidence in this model is about determining the effect of changes in upstream or
downstream tax rates on both producers and retailers prices.7 These effects, and the
corresponding ones for quantities, can be readily calculated from equations (3)-(7). As it
can be anticipated, results depend crucially on the value of γ, which reflects the degree of
product differentiation and hence the level of (downstream and upstream) market power.
Incidence effects of upstream taxes. An increase in an upstream tax rate affects pro-
ducer and retailer prices as follows:
dpj
dτi
= ω ;
dpk
dτi
= θ ;
dpij
dτi
= ρ ;
dpij
dτh
= σ
where j refers to producer in region i and k refers to producer in the other region (labeled
h below).
Incidence effects of downstream taxes. Similarly, an increase in a downstream tax rate
affects producer and retailer prices as follows:
dpj
dti
=
dpj
dth
= −δ ;
dpij
dti
= α ;
dpij
dth
= −β
Figures 1 and 2 show these effects for different values of γ.
3.2 Specific results: cases of γ = {0, 1,∞}
Table 1 shows the case with γ = 0 (left panel), an intermediate case with positive γ
(γ = 1, represented in the middle panel) and the extreme case with γ →∞ (right panel).
7 There is a vast literature on tax incidence under different market structures, with emphasis on the
comparison between ad valorem versus per unit taxes in terms of efficiency and the degree of forward
shifting. We refer the reader to Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for a general discussion.
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Figure 1: Tax incidence: producer tax rates
Case: γ = 0. In this case there is no downstream competition in each region, so the
incidence results are the expected from a situation with two separate monopolies in both
regions, each one characterized by the standard producer-retailer relationship and the
double marginalization described in the industrial organization literature (see Tirole, 1988,
p.174; see also Bishop, 1968, regarding the shifting effect of a per unit tax in a monopoly).
Results are summarized in the left panel of Table 1.
Consider first increasing upstream taxes in one region. An increase in τi (say, τ1)
passes-through producer price in region i (product A) by half, and through retail prices
(i.e., p1A and p2A) by one fourth, the increase in τi. On the other hand, the increase in
τi does not affect the producer price pB (produced in province h) nor their corresponding
retail prices (in the example, p1B and p2B).
Next, consider increasing downstream tax rates. An increase in t1 (in region 1) induces
backward-shifting for both producer prices sold in province 1 (pA and pB , by -1/4 the
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Figure 2: Tax incidence: retail tax rates
increase in t1), and forward-shifting for prices of final products sold in the same region
(p1A and p1B, by 3/8 the increase in t1). Moreover, the reduction in producer prices is
partially passed-through retail prices in the other region (p2A and p2B, by 1/8 the increase
in t1).
Case: γ = 1. Next, consider the case that products are subject to some competition
(γ = 1).
An increase in τ1 passes through both retail prices (p1A and p2A) and producer price
pA, just as in the previous case with γ = 0. But in this case, product 1B (resp. 2B)
compete with 1A (resp. 2A) given the model of price competition set out in Section 2.
Since prices are strategic complements, it will follow an increase in p1B and p2B (and
corresponding reactions in p1A and p2A). Moreover, pB is also strategic complement to pA
and therefore both producer prices will settle in a higer level.8
8 Comparing the left and middle panels of Table 1, the direct effect of τ1 on pA is 0.5 and the indirect
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Table 1: Tax incidence. Specific cases
γ = 0 γ = 1 γ →∞
t1 t2 τ1 τ2 t1 t2 τ1 τ2 t1 t2 τ1 τ2
pA -1/4 -1/4 1/2 0 -0.21 -0.21 0.51 0.07 0 0 2/3 1/3
pB -1/4 -1/4 0 1/2 -0.21 -0.21 0.07 0.51 0 0 1/3 2/3
p1A 3/8 -1/8 1/4 0 0.53 -0.14 0.28 0.11 1 0 5/9 4/9
p1B 3/8 -1/8 0 1/4 0.53 -0.14 0.11 0.28 1 0 4/9 5/9
p2A -1/8 3/8 1/4 0 -0.14 0.53 0.28 0.11 0 1 5/9 4/9
p2B -1/8 3/8 0 1/4 -0.14 0.53 0.11 0.28 0 1 4/9 5/9
x1A -3/8 1/8 -1/4 0 -0.53 0.14 -0.46 0.07 -1 0 -∞ ∞
x1B -3/8 1/8 0 -1/4 -0.53 0.14 0.07 -0.46 -1 0 ∞ -∞
x2A 1/8 -3/8 -1/4 0 0.14 -0.53 -0.46 0.07 0 -1 -∞ ∞
x2B 1/8 -3/8 0 -1/4 0.14 -0.53 0.07 -0.46 0 -1 ∞ -∞
Next, consider increasing downstream tax rates. An increase in t1 (in region 1) induces
backward-shifting for both producer prices sold in province 1, forward-shifting for prices
of final products sold in the same region, and pass through to retail prices in the other
region. But a second-order effect enters into effect as final products are substitutes and
retail prices strategically interact: the increase in p1A and p1B exceeds 3/8 to internalize
cross-effects (this is the main effect), pushing producer prices –and hence retail prices
in the other region– upwards. However, the second order effect is not strong enough to
overcome the main effect (described with γ = 0). As γ increases, the second-order effect
pushes upwards retail prices in the provinces that increases retail tax rate (up to full pass
through), and fully compensate the first-order effect of backwards shifting for producer
prices and retail prices in the other province.
effect is 0.01, while the indirect effect on pB is 0.07. The direct effect of τ1 on p1A and p2A is 0.25 and
the indirect effect is 0.03, while the indirect effect on p1B and p2B is 0.11.
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Case: γ →∞. Finally, this case reflects a market in which products are subject to
intense competition (in the extreme, final products are perfect substitutes). Assume that
producers and retailers are symmetric on the cost side.
An increase in τ1 causes that retail cost of product A increases in both regiones,
and they cannot compete in an homogeneous-product market. As a consequence, only
product B will be sold in both regions. On the other hand, an increase in downstream
tax rate (t1) produces full shifting results in the corresponding region (p1A and p1B) and
null effects on producer prices (see Bishop, 1968, for shifting of per unit taxes under
perfect competition, and Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002, for shifting of per unit taxes under
Bertrand competition). Consequently, retail prices in the other region remain unaltered.
4 Provinces - Revenue maximization
In this section we assume that provinces maximize tax revenue. Pure tax collection is the
natural starting point to analyze why governments choose taxing several links in the value
chain. In another paper we deal with the same problem when provinces have different
objective, specifically, a local welfare function.
With the information from Section 2.2, provincial tax revenues are
R1 = (τ1 + t1)x1A + t1x1B + τ1x2A
= (τ1 + t1) (Γ1A − αt1 + βt2− µτ1 + κτ2) + t1 (Γ1B − αt1 + βt2 + κτ1 − µτ2)
+τ1 (Γ2A + βt1− αt2 − µτ1 + κτ2)
R2 = (τ2 + t2)x2B + t2x2A + τ2x1B
= (τ2 + t2) (Γ2B + βt1 − αt2 + κτ1 − µτ2) + t2 (Γ2A + βt1− αt2 − µτ1 + κτ2) +
τ2 (Γ1B − αt1 + βt2 + κτ1 − µτ2)
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4.1 Full taxation
When governments collect upstream and downstream taxes, the first-order conditions for
tax rates are
t1 : Γ1A + Γ1B − 4αt1 + 2βt2 − 2ψτ1 − ψτ2 = 0 (8)
τ1 : Γ1A + Γ2A − 4µτ1 + 2κτ2 − 2ψt1 − ψt2 = 0 (9)
t2 : Γ2A + Γ2B − 4αt2 + 2βt1 − 2ψτ2 − ψτ1 = 0 (10)
τ2 : Γ2B + Γ1B − 4µτ2 + 2κτ1 − 2ψt2 − ψt1 = 0 (11)
Result 1 Reaction functions for government i’s downstream (upstream) tax rates are
strategic complements with respect government j’s downstream (upstream) tax rates and
strategic substitutes with respect to government j’s upstream (downstream) tax rates.
This result states that a provincial government reduces the tax burden on retail sales
when the other government increases upstream rates or increases retail rates. On the
other hand, a government reduces upstream rates when the other government increases
downstream rates or decreases upstream rates.
Lemma 1 If t2 = τ2 = 0, government 1’s tax rates are t1(0, 0) > 0 and τ1(0, 0) > 0, and
viceversa.
Proof: Working with government 1’s reaction functions we get
t1 =
(2µ− ψ)(Γ1A + Γ1B)
2(4αµ − ψ2)
> 0 and τ1 =
(2α − ψ)(Γ1A + Γ2A)
2(4αµ − ψ2)
> 0
Q.E.D.
If a government does not collect taxes, the best response by the other government is
to set positive upstream and downstream taxes. This sheds light on the main results of
this section, i.e., of taxing at both levels of economic transactions whenever possible.
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The solution to conditions (8)-(11) is reported in Appendix B. Equations (38)-(41)
correspond to the interior solution; equations (46)-(48) correspond to the case when t∗1 = 0;
equations (49)-(51) when t∗2 = 0; equations (52)-(54) when τ
∗
1 = 0; and equations (55)-(57)
when τ ∗2 = 0.
As it can be seen from those equations, the solution depends on the combination
of nine parameters (a1, a2, c1A, c1B, c2A, c2B, cA, cB, γ).Rather than following this path, we
develop a sequence of propositions on tax rates in equilibrium under different scenarios.
First, we develop the case of symmetric demands and costs.
Proposition 1 Symmetric solution. Let Λ = a− cR− cP and Γ1A = Γ1B = Γ2A = Γ2B =
Γ = ψΛ. Equilibrium rates are tS1 = t
S
2 = t
S satisfying (12) and τS1 = τ
S
2 = τ
S satisfying
(13).
tS =
Γ(2µ − ψ)
4(2α − β)(2µ− κ)− 9ψ2
(12)
τS =
Γ(2α − ψ)
4(2α − β)(2µ− κ)− 9ψ2
(13)
Proof: See Appendix B.1.
When γ = 0 we see that all rates are positive, with upstream rates doubling down-
stream rates; specifically, tS(γ = 0) = 2Λ/11 and τS(γ = 0) = 2tS(γ = 0). As γ increases,
upstream rates decrease while the burden switches to retail taxation. Finally, when prod-
ucts are homogeneous governments give up upstream taxation and concentrate on retail
taxation, i.e., tS(γ →∞) = Λ/2 and τS(γ →∞) = 0.
Recall that in the case of γ = 0, absent taxation, upstream mark-ups double down-
stream mark-ups (this is the standard double-mark up result in a producer-retailer re-
lationship without competition; see Tirole, 1998, chapter 4). It is straightforward to
understand that a provincial government –whose objective is to raise tax revenue– will
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Figure 3: Equilibrium upstream and downstream tax rates under symmetry
follow the private solution and set tax rates in a similar way as firms set the price structure.
Therefore, τ = 2t and there is a double-tax-rate-mark up result.
As the degree of product differentiation decreases (higher γ) downstream competition
gets stronger. Governments switch from upstream to downstream taxation, i.e., τ de-
creases and t increases in γ, as shown in Figure 3. In the limiting case of homogeneous
products at the downstream level, there is no room to collect taxes in the upstream. If a
provincial government (say 1) increases the upstream rate (τA) it imposes a disadvantage
on product A in both provinces (by artificially increasing retail cost) to the point of driv-
ing it out of both markets, and is left to collect retail tax on the good produced in the
other province. On the other hand, when the government raises downstream taxes, it does
so uniformly on all retailers selling products in the province. Since downstream taxation
does not create asymmetries on retail competition, there is room to collect downstream
taxes.
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Moreover, as the degree of differentiation is reduced tax revenues increase because tax
bases increase for both provinces. In other words, the higher the γ the lower the markup
that retailers and producers set on their products, and the higher the quantities for given
market sizes (Λ = a− cR − cP ). It follows that provincial collect higher tax revenues.
In the remainder of the section we focus on specific asymmetries. The next four
propositions, each one accompanied by a Figure, share the following pattern. First, we
consider cases such that, in the absence of taxes, retailers and producers are active. In each
Figure, a dotted line will identify the set of parameters that satisfy this condition (leaving
aside a set of ruled-out parameters; see Appendix A). Second, the selected asymmetry may
induce governments to switch from full taxation (i.e., collecting upstream and downstream
taxes) to partial taxation (i.e., foregoing either upstream or downstream taxes). Therefore
we identify a threshold in parameters that divide the cases of full or partial taxation
(a dashed line). Third, under either asymmetry (parameters or equilibrium tax rates)
producer or retailer mark ups may become negative. In order to keep the paper tractable,
we assume parameters such that all markets –wholesale and retailer– remain open in
the tax equilibrium (a possibly stringent constraint than the first one detailed here).9
Therefore we identify the threshold in parameters for non-negative mark ups (a solid
line). Using both thresholds, we develop the following results.
In the first case, we assume asymmetries in market size.
Proposition 2 Asymmetries in market size. Assume symmetric cost structures (c1A =
c1B = c2A = c2B = cR and cA = cB = cP ) and let a2 ≥ a1. There are two functions
a2/a1(γ) and a¯2/a1(γ), continuous and increasing, that intersect at γˆa2. If γ < γˆa2,
equilibrium taxes are such that {t2 > t1 > 0; τ1 > τ2 > 0} if a2/a1 ≤ a2/a1(γ) and
{t1 = 0; t2 > 0; τ1 > τ2 > 0} if a2/a1(γ) < a2/a1 ≤ a¯2/a1(γ). If γ ≥ γˆa2, equilibrium taxes
9 When asymmetries are sufficiently large, it is possible that a retailer or producer closes down the
market, leaving the other retailer or producer as a (retailer or wholesale) monopolist.
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are such that {t2 > t1 > 0; τ1 > τ2 > 0} if a2/a1 ≤ a¯2/a1(γ).
Proof: See Appendix B.2.
Figure 4 displays the configuration of parameters for the equilibrium full-tax (zone I)
and partial-tax (zone II) cases.
Figure 4: Equilibrium taxation with asymmetric market sizes. Case: c1A = c1B =
c2A = c2B = cR, cA = cB = cP , and a2 > a1.
Three explanations are in order. Firstly, for a given asymmetry, upstream tax rates
decrease, and dowstream tax rates increase, in γ, for the same reasons as in the sym-
metric case. Secondly, asymmetries in market sizes turn into asymmetries in tax rates.
Specifically, t2 > t1, i.e., province 2 biases taxes to downstream transactions (where the
tax base is relatively larger); while τ1 > τ2, i.e., province 1 biases taxes to upstream
transactions. The rates {t2, τ1, τ2} increase in a2. Also, for large values of a2, province 1
drops down downstream taxes (t1) and concentrates only on upstream taxation (again,
to take advantage of the larger tax base in the retail market 2). In our case, this happens
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for intermediate-to-high product differentiation, as we rule out cases with t1 = 0 and high
γ because of negative profitability in the downstream market 1A. Thirdly, asymmetries
in upstream taxes tend to disappear as γ →∞ because upstream tax rates tend to zero;
however, downstream rates remain asymmetric as provinces collect retail taxes in differ-
ently sized markets.
In the second case, we assume asymmetries in retail costs by province.
Proposition 3 Regional asymmetries in retail costs. Assume symmetric market sizes (a1 =
a2 = a), symmetric producer costs (cA = cB = cP ) and symmetric retailer costs by region
(c1A = c1B = c1, = c2A = c2B = c2), but allow asymmetries between regional retail costs
c1 ≥ c2. There are two functions c1/c2(γ) and c¯1/c2(γ), continuous and increasing, that
intersect at γˆc2. If γ < γˆc2, equilibrium taxes are such that {t2 > t1 > 0; τ1 > τ2 > 0}
if c1/c2 ≤ c1/c2(γ) and {t1 = 0; t2 > 0; τ1 > τ2 > 0} if c1/c2(γ) < c1/c2 ≤ c¯2/c1(γ). If
γ ≥ γˆc2, equilibrium taxes are such that {t2 > t1 > 0; τ1 > τ2 > 0} if c1/c2 ≤ c¯1/c2(γ).
Proof: See Appendix B.3.
Figure 5 displays the configuration of parameters for the equilibrium full-tax (zone I)
and partial-tax (zone II) cases.
Results from Proposition 3 mirror those of Proposition 2 as c1 > c2 is qualitatively
similar to a2 > a1 in terms of net market value (a1 − c1 − cP vs a2− c2 − cP ). Therefore,
upstream rates decrease and downstream rates increase in γ; t1 decreases and t2 increase
in c1/c2 (substitution effect between t1 and c1). Both rates τ1 and τ2 decrease in c1 (with
τ2 < τ1 because t2 increases and t1 decreases, eventually to 0).
In the third case, we assume asymmetries in producer costs.
Proposition 4 Asymmetries in producer costs. Assume symmetric market sizes (a1 =
a2 = a) and retail cost structures (c1A = c1B = c2A = c2B = cR), and let cA > cB. There is
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Figure 5: Equilibrium taxation with asymmetric regional costs by region. Case:
a1 = a2 = a, cA = cB = cP , c1A = c1B = c1, c2A = c2B = c2, and c1 ≥ c2.
a function c¯A/cB(γ), continuous and decreasing in γ, such that {t2 > t1 > 0; τ1 > τ2 > 0}
for cA/cB < cA/cB(γ).
Proof: See Appendix B.4.
Figure 6 displays the configuration of parameters for the relevant equilibrium zone
(which corresponds to the zone I of full taxation).10
We highlight two results. First, for a certain degree of product differentiation, the
higher the relative cost of product A the relative market size of product A is reduced.
This implies that government in province 1 reduces both τ1 (the most affected rate) and
t1. Government 2 adjusts upstream tax rate downwards (a strategic complement effect to
τ1) and increases downstream rate (a strategic substitute effect to τ1). Second, for a given
10 Even though there is a feasible zone with partial tax rates (specifically, t1 = 0), the constraint on
non-negative markups is binding within this zone.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium taxation with asymmetric producer costs. Case: a1 = a2 =
a, c1A = c1B = c2A = c2B = cR, and cA > cB.
asymmetry in producer costs, upstream rates decrease, downstream rate t2 increases in
product homogeneity, while t1 increases for low and intermediate values of γ, which is a
standard result.11
In the fourth case, we assume asymmetries in retail costs by product.
Proposition 5 Asymmetries in retail costs by products. Assume symmetric market sizes
(a1 = a2 = a), symmetric producer costs (cA = cB = cP ) and symmetric retailer costs by
product (c1A = c2A = cRA, = c1B = c2B = cRB), but allow asymmetries between retail costs
11 We showed in the proof of Proposition 4 that τ1 increases in cA for γ > γAB ' 10. Also, for some
intermediate value of product differentiation, t1 decreases in γ. Although it may seem at first unclear,
this result is a consequence of a strong reduction in t1 due to the increase in cA, which overcomes the
standard effect of an increase in t1 with γ. Accordingly, the government in province 1 switches taxes
from t1 to τ1.
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by products cRA ≥ cRB. There are two functions cRA/cRB(γ) and c¯RA/cRB(γ), continuous
and decreasing. Equilibrium taxes are such that {t1 > t2 > 0; τ2 > τ1 > 0} if cRA/cRB ≤
cRA/cRB(γ) and {t1 > t2 > 0; τ1 = 0; τ2 > 0} if cRA/cRB(γ) < cRA/cRB ≤ c¯RA/cRB(γ)
Proof: See Appendix B.5.
Figure 7 displays the configuration of parameters for the equilibrium full-tax (zone I)
and partial-tax (zone II) cases.
Figure 7: Equilibrium taxation with asymmetric retail costs by product. Case:
a1 = a2 = a, cA = cB = cP , c1A = c2A = cRA, c1B = c2B = cRB, and cRA ≥ cRB
As in the previous case, the link of tax rates with γ is straightforward. Second, a
relative increase in the retail cost cRA/cRB reduces the market size of retail markets 1A
and 2A (and also the product market A), inducing t1, t2 and τ1 downwards, and τ2 up-
wards; this way province 2 reacts strategically by taxing more heavily product B in the
production source. Third, as the asymmetry becomes intense, government in province 1
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foregoes upstream taxation to compensate downstream costs (τ1 = 0).
We conclude that provided that rates are non-negative (i.e., subsidies are ruled out)
and products display a certain level of heterogeneity (γ is finite), either all rates are
positive or at most one rate is set to zero. From Propositions 2 to 5 no two cases with
zero-tax rate overlap: if a2 >> a1 (so that t1 = 0) both τ1 and τ2 adjust increasingly in a2;
which cannot be met at the same time with cRA/cRB too high (low) for τ2 = 0 (τ1 = 0).
Finally, when products are homogeneous (γ → ∞) only downstream rates are positive,
while upstream rates converge to zero. This is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 Assume both governments choose tax rates in order to maximize revenues
(Leviathan solution). If γ is finite and parameters are such that an equilibrium exists, tax
rates are (t∗1, τ
∗
1 , t
∗
2, τ
∗
2 ) either all positive or only one of them equal to zero. If γ → ∞,
both upstream rates are equal to zero.
4.2 Upstream / downstream taxation
Assume governments collect upstream taxes. Setting t1 = 0 and t2 = 0, and adapting
conditions (9) and (11) to upstream rates, the solution is
τ1 =
2µ(Γ1A + Γ2A) + κ(Γ1B + Γ2B)
2(4µ2 − κ2)
; τ2 =
κ(Γ1A + Γ2A) + 2µ(Γ1B + Γ2B)
2(4µ2 − κ2)
On the other hand, if governments collect downstream taxes, setting τ1 = 0 and τ2 = 0,
and adapting conditions (8) and (10) to downstream rates, the solution is
t1 =
2α(Γ1A + Γ1B) + β(Γ2A + Γ2B)
2(4α2 − β2)
; t2 =
β(Γ1A + Γ1B) + 2α(Γ2A + Γ2B)
2(4α2 − β2)
Proposition 7 Revenue with full rates is higher than revenue with upstream / down-
stream taxes if γ is finite, and equal to revenue with downstream taxes if goods are homo-
geneous.
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Proof: Proposition 6 states that the full solution involves at least one more active rate
than the solution with upstream or downstream rates. Only in the case of γ → ∞ the
full-rate solution converges to downstream taxation. Q.E.D.
Therefore, there is strong ground for using successive taxation when the objective of
provincial governments is to collect taxes. A companion paper analyzes the robustness of
this result to other objective functions, particularly welfare functions (subject to a given
level of revenue needs).
4.3 Cooperative solution with full taxes
This section explores the relationship between competitive taxation and coordinated tax-
ation, and focuses on whether uncoordinated taxation involves over-taxation (a standard
result in the literature of competitive taxation) and on whether all rates are active (or if
coordination suggests using only upstream or downstream rates). Assume that provinces
1 and 2 coordinate their selection of tax rates. The first-order conditions corresponding
to the joint maximization of R1 +R2 are
t1 : Γ1A + Γ1B − 4αt1 + 4βt2 − 2ψτ1 − 2ψτ2 = 0 (14)
τ1 : Γ1A + Γ2A − 4µτ1 + 4κτ2 − 2ψt1 − 2ψt2 = 0 (15)
t2 : Γ2A + Γ2B − 4αt2 + 4βt1 − 2ψτ2 − 2ψτ1 = 0 (16)
τ2 : Γ2B + Γ1B − 4µτ2 + 4κτ1 − 2ψt2 − 2ψt1 = 0 (17)
First, working on these conditions, the solution is not unique, but rather involves a
(multiple) combination of tax rates such that
tC1 + t
C
2 + τ
C
1 + τ
C
2 =
Γ1A + Γ1B + Γ2A + Γ2B
4ψ
(18)
tC1 − t
C
2 =
Γ1A + Γ1B − Γ2A − Γ2B
4(α + β)
(19)
τC1 − τ
C
2 =
Γ1A + Γ2A − Γ1B − Γ2B
4(µ + κ)
(20)
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Notice that the solution from conditions (18)-(20) could draw two, three or four non-
negative tax rates. The case with two non-zero rates could arise in very particular cases,
such as large Γ1A and small Γ1B ,Γ2A,Γ2B , in which case it is optimal to tax in province
1, or large market 1 (both Γ1A and Γ1B), in which case it is optimal to downstream tax
in province 1 (t1) and upstream tax in province 2 (τ2).
Second, Proposition 8 provides a straightforward result regarding over-taxation:
Proposition 8 The equilibrium tax rates imply over-taxation if there is a minimum de-
gree of product differentiation, and the level of cooperative taxation if products are homo-
geneous.
Proof: Consider the full solution with positive rates from equations (38)-(41). The
sum of all four rates is equal to
2(Γ1A + Γ1B + Γ2A + Γ2B)(2α − β + 2µ − κ− 3ψ)
4(2α − β)(2µ− κ)− 9ψ2
Comparing this condition with (18), it is easy to verify that
H(γ) =
2(2α − β − κ+ 2µ − 3ψ)
4(2α − β)(2µ− κ)− 9ψ2
>
1
4ψ
for finite γ and H(∞)→ 1 = 1
ψ(∞)
. Q.E.D.
When the objective of provincial government is maximize tax revenues, the choice of
tax rates in equilibrium leaves them with lower level of tax revenues. Only when products
are homogeneous (γ →∞) the competitive solution equals the cooperative one.
The replacement of Γ1A to Γ2B by their corresponding definitions into (18) generates
the following condition
tC1 + t
C
2 + τ
C
1 + τ
C
2 =
1
4
[2(a1 + a2)− 2(cA + cB)− (c1A + c1B + c2A + c2B)] (21)
which states that the sum of tax rates under the cooperative solution is independent of the
degree of product differentiation (γ). On the other hand, equilibrium taxation depends on
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the level of product differentiation. When products are extremely heterogeneous (γ = 0)
the degree of over-taxation is small. But the difference between cooperative tax revenue
and equilibrium joint tax revenue increases as products are less heterogeneous.
5 Conclusions and future research
This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country. In order to
do so, we set up a two-good, two-province, two-stage successive differentiated-product
oligopoly model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product
through exclusive retailers located in both provinces. Retailers compete for consumers a
la Bertrand with differentiated products. The producer-retailer setup allows provincial
governments to raise taxes on both upstream and downstream links of the value chain.
With this model, we study tax incidence and Leviathan non-cooperative taxation.
The tax incidence properties of the model are such that the effect of changes in up-
stream or downstream tax rates on producer and retailer prices depend crucially on the
degree of product differentiation and therefore on the level of (downstream and upstream)
market power.
In the full-tax solution we find that provinces raise both upstream and downstream
taxes, but the mix between the two instruments depends on the degree of downstream com-
petition and market asymmetries. When there is little downstream competition provinces
set rates so that upstream transactions are more heavily taxed (double marginalization
effect), but the tax mix shifts towards retail transactions as competition becomes more
intense. In sufficiently asymmetric cases (on demand size or cost) one province may drop
one tax rate. The retail rate is set to zero when demands, retail cost by region or producer
costs are sufficiently different. On the other hand, the producer rate is set to zero when
retail costs by product are sufficiently different. We compare the full-tax solution with
specific cases (upstream and downstream taxation, and cooperative taxation). We find
that multi-stage taxation dominates other forms of indirect taxation (either downstream
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or upstream) and implies over-taxation when compared with coordinated provincial tax-
ation.
The paper is part of a research agenda which studies successive taxation. While
the main focus was on revenue maximization, we left aside an important component of
provincial objectives, which is local welfare. A companion paper analyzes this extension.
Also, we focused the analysis on provincial governments within a country, but the main
problem applies to national governments within a union. In particular, successive taxation
was not considered so far in the analysis of origin vs destination principles.
This paper challenges the cascade effect on the grounds that, when (local) governments
choose what link of the value chain to tax, this effect trades off against import or export
of tax bases. This issue is very important within the tax harmonization literature and
deserves future research.
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Appendix
A Relevant parameters and no-tax equilibrium
From section 2.2.2 we find first-order conditions for pA and pB and solve for equilibrium prices.
Constants terms (other than those multiplying tax rates) are:
ΦA = δ (a1 + a2 − c1A − c2A) +
θ
2
[c1B + c2B − c1A − c2A] + ωcA + θcB (22)
ΦB = δ (a1 + a2 − c1B − c2B) +
θ
2
[c1A + c2A − c1B − c2B] + θcA + ωcB (23)
Replacing pA and pA into p1A to p2B we get retailers prices. Constants terms (other than those
multiplying tax rates) are:
Ψ1A =
a1
(2 + γ)
+
(1 + γ) [2(1 + γ)(ΦA+ c1A) + γ(ΦB + c1B)]
(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
(24)
Ψ1B =
a1
(2 + γ)
+
(1 + γ) [2(1 + γ)(ΦB + c1B) + γ(ΦA+ c1A)]
(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
(25)
Ψ2A =
a2
(2 + γ)
+
(1 + γ) [2(1 + γ)(ΦA+ c2A) + γ(ΦB + c2B)]
(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
(26)
Ψ2B =
a2
(2 + γ)
+
(1 + γ) [2(1 + γ)(ΦB + c2B) + γ(ΦA+ c2A)]
(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
(27)
Finally, replacing prices into x1A to x2B we get quantities. Constants terms (other than those
multiplying tax rates) are:
Γ1A = α(a1 − c1A)− β (a2 − c2A)−
(1 + γ)
(2 + γ)
(ωcA + θcB) +
(1 + γ)2
2(2 + γ)2
θ
β
(cB − cA)
+
γ(1 + γ)2
4(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
[(2 + ω) (c1B − c1A)− (2− ω) (c2B − c2A)] (28)
Γ1B = α(a1 − c1B)− β (a2 − c2B)−
(1 + γ)
(2 + γ)
(ωcA + θcB) +
(1 + γ)2
2(2 + γ)2
θ
β
(cB − cA)
+
γ(1 + γ)2
4(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
[(2 + ω) (c1A − c1B)− (2− ω) (c2A − c2B)] (29)
Γ2A = α(a2 − c2A)− β (a1 − c1A)−
(1 + γ)
(2 + γ)
(ωcB + θcA) +
(1 + γ)2
2(2 + γ)2
θ
β
(cA − cB)
+
γ(1 + γ)2
4(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
[(2 + ω) (c2B − c2A)− (2− ω) (c1B − c1A)] (30)
Γ2B = α(a2 − c2B)− β (a1 − c1B)−
(1 + γ)
(2 + γ)
(ωcB + θcA) +
(1 + γ)2
2(2 + γ)2
θ
β
(cA − cB)
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+
γ(1 + γ)2
4(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
[(2 + ω) (c2A − c2B)− (2− ω) (c1A − c1B)] (31)
where we make use of the following definitions:
α =
3(1 + γ)(2+ 3γ) + 2γ(1+ γ)2
2 [2(2 + 3γ) + γ(1+ γ)] (2 + γ)
, β =
(1 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
2 [2(2 + 3γ) + γ(1+ γ)] (2 + γ)
(32)
∆ =
1
[2(2 + 3γ) + 3γ(1 + γ)] [2(2 + 3γ) + γ(1 + γ)]
, θ = γ(1 + γ)λ (33)
ω = 2[(2 + 3γ) + γ(1 + γ)]2∆ , δ =
(2 + 3γ)
2[2(2+ 3γ) + γ(1 + γ)]
(34)
λ = [(2 + 3γ) + γ(1+ γ)]∆ , ρ =
(1 + γ)(2ω(1+ γ) + γθ)
(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
(35)
µ =
(1 + γ)
4(2 + γ)
ω
δ
+
γ(1+ γ)2
(2 + γ)
λ , κ =
γ(1 + γ)2
2(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
ω (36)
σ =
(1 + γ)(2θ(1+ γ) + γω)
(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
, ψ =
(1 + γ)[(2+ 3γ) + γ(1+ γ)]
(2 + γ) [2(2 + 3γ) + γ(1 + γ)]
(37)
Notice that (ΦA,ΦB) are the no-tax equilibrium upstream prices, (Ψ1A,Ψ1B,Ψ2A,Ψ2B) are
the no-tax equilibrium downstream prices, and (Γ1A,Γ1B,Γ2A,Γ2B) are the no-tax equilibrium
quantities. We assume parameters such that the no-tax solution is interior. In the following
proofs, parameters that do not satisfy this assumption will be referred to as ruled-out parameters.
B Proof of Propositions 1 to 3
As a preface to the proof of propositions 1 to 3, the interior solution to (8)-(9) can be written as
t∗1 =
(Γ1A + Γ1B)
(
64αµ2 − 8ψ2κ− 20ψ2µ− 16ακ2
)
−(Γ2A + Γ2B)
(
8βκ2 − 10ψ2κ− 16ψ2µ− 32βµ2
)
−(Γ1A + Γ2A)
(
8ψακ+ 8ψβκ+ 32ψαµ+ 8ψβµ− 6ψ3
)
−(Γ1B + Γ2B)
(
16ψακ+ 4ψβκ+ 16ψαµ+ 16ψβµ+ 3ψ3
)
9ψ4 − 8ψ2(5βκ+ 8βµ+ 8ακ+ 20αµ) + 16(4µ2 − κ2)(4α2 − β2)
(38)
τ∗1 =
(Γ1A + Γ1B)
(
6ψ3 − 32ψαµ− 8ψβκ− 8ψακ− 8ψβµ
)
−(Γ2A + Γ2B)
(
3ψ3 + 16ψακ+ 16ψβµ+ 16ψαµ+ 4ψβκ
)
+(Γ1A + Γ2A)
(
64α2µ− 20ψ2α− 6ψ2β − 16β2µ
)
+(Γ1B + Γ2B)
(
16ψ2α + 8ψ2β + 32α2κ− 8β2κ
)
9ψ4 − 8ψ2(5βκ+ 8βµ+ 8ακ + 20αµ) + 16(4µ2 − κ2)(4α2 − β2)
(39)
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t∗2 =
(Γ2A + Γ2B)
(
64αµ2 − 8ψ2κ − 20ψ2µ− 16ακ2
)
−(Γ1A + Γ1B)
(
8βκ2 − 10ψ2κ − 16ψ2µ− 32βµ2
)
−(Γ1A + Γ2A)
(
16ψακ+ 4ψβκ+ 16ψαµ+ 16ψβµ+ 3ψ3
)
−(Γ1B + Γ2B)
(
8ψακ+ 8ψβκ+ 32ψαµ+ 8ψβµ− 6ψ3
)
9ψ4 − 8ψ2(5βκ+ 8βµ+ 8ακ+ 20αµ) + 16(4µ2 − κ2)(4α2 − β2)
(40)
τ∗2 =
(Γ2A + Γ2B)
(
6ψ3 − 32ψαµ− 8ψβκ− 8ψακ− 8ψβµ
)
−(Γ1A + Γ1B)
(
3ψ3 + 16ψακ+ 16ψβµ+ 16ψαµ+ 4ψβκ
)
+(Γ1B + Γ2B)
(
64α2µ− 20ψ2α− 6ψ2β − 16β2µ
)
+(Γ1A + Γ2A)
(
16ψ2α+ 8ψ2β + 32α2κ − 8β2κ
)
9ψ4 − 8ψ2(5βκ+ 8βµ+ 8ακ + 20αµ) + 16(4µ2 − κ2)(4α2 − β2)
(41)
where Γ1A to Γ2B are defined in (28)-(31). Alternatively, replacing Γ1A to Γ2B into (38)-(41) the
tax rates can be written as a function of main parameters (a1, a2, cA, cB, c1A, c1B, c2A, c2B, γ):
t1 = w
t1
a1a1 + w
t1
a2a2 + w
t1
c1Ac1A +w
t1
c1Bc1B +w
t1
c2Ac2A + w
t1
c2Bc2B + w
t1
cAcA + w
t1
cBcB (42)
τ1 = w
τ1
a1a1 + w
τ1
a2a2 + w
τ1
c1Ac1A +w
τ1
c1Bc1B +w
τ1
c2Ac2A +w
τ1
c2Bc2B +w
τ1
cAcA + w
τ1
cBcB (43)
t2 = w
t2
a1a1 + w
t2
a2a2 + w
t2
c1Ac1A +w
t2
c1Bc1B +w
t2
c2Ac2A + w
t2
c2Bc2B + w
t2
cAcA + w
t2
cBcB (44)
τ2 = w
τ2
a1a1 + w
τ2
a2a2 + w
τ2
c1Ac1A +w
τ2
c1Bc1B +w
τ2
c2Ac2A +w
τ2
c2Bc2B +w
τ2
cAcA + w
τ2
cBcB (45)
When parameters are such that (38) is negative, the solution is t∗1 = 0 and
τ∗1 =
(4ακ+ ψ2)(Γ1B + Γ2B) + 2(4αµ− ψ
2)(Γ1A + Γ2A)− 2ψ(µ+ κ)(Γ2A + Γ2B)
2(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(46)
t∗2 =
−ψ(4µ+ κ)(Γ1B + Γ2B)− 2ψ(µ+ κ)(Γ1A + Γ2A) + 2(4µ
2 − κ2)(Γ2A + Γ2B)
2(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(47)
τ∗2 =
(16αµ− ψ2)(Γ1B + Γ2B) + 2(4ακ+ ψ
2)(Γ1A + Γ2A)− 2ψ(4µ+ κ)(Γ2A + Γ2B)
4(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(48)
When parameters are such that (40) is negative, the solution is t∗2 = 0 and
t∗1 =
−ψ(4µ+ κ)(Γ1A + Γ2A)− 2ψ(µ+ κ)(Γ1B + Γ2B) + 2(4µ
2 − κ2)(Γ1A + Γ1B)
2(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(49)
τ∗1 =
(16αµ− ψ2)(Γ1A + Γ2A) + 2(4ακ+ ψ
2)(Γ1B + Γ2B)− 2ψ(4µ+ κ)(Γ1A + Γ1B)
4(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(50)
τ∗2 =
(4ακ+ ψ2)(Γ1A + Γ2A) + 2(4αµ− ψ
2)(Γ1B + Γ2B)− 2ψ(µ+ κ)(Γ1A + Γ1B)
2(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(51)
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When parameters are such that (39) is negative, the solution is τ∗1 = 0 and
t∗1 =
2ψ(α+ β)(Γ1B + Γ2B) + 2(4αµ− ψ
2)(Γ1A + Γ1B) + (2βµ− ψ
2)(Γ2A + Γ2B)
2(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(52)
t∗2 =
−2ψ(4α+ β)(Γ1B + Γ2B) + 2(4βµ− ψ
2)(Γ1A + Γ1B)− (16αµ− ψ
2)(Γ2A + Γ2B)
4(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(53)
τ∗2 =
−2(4α2 − β2)(Γ1B + Γ2B) + 2ψ(α+ β)(Γ1A + Γ1B) + ψ(4α+ β)(Γ2A + Γ2B)
2(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(54)
When parameters are such that (41) is negative, the solution is τ∗2 = 0 and
t∗1 =
2ψ(4α+ β)(Γ1A + Γ2A) + (16αµ− ψ
2)(Γ1A + Γ1B) + 2(4βµ+ ψ
2)(Γ2A + Γ2B)
4(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(55)
τ∗1 =
−2(4α2 − β2)(Γ1A + Γ2A) + (4α+ β)(Γ1A + Γ1B) + 2ψ(α+ β)(Γ2A + Γ2B)
2(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(56)
t∗2 =
−2ψ(α+ β)(Γ1A + Γ2A)− (4βµ+ ψ
2)(Γ1A + Γ1B)− 2(4αµ− ψ
2)(Γ2A + Γ2B)
2(4α(4µ2 − κ2)− ψ2(5µ+ 2κ))
(57)
B.1 Proof of proposition 1
If demand and costs are symmetric (a1 = a2 = a, c1A = c1B = c2A = c2B = cR, cA = cB = cP ),
then the functions Γ1A to Γ2B defined in (28)-(31) simplify to
Γ1A = Γ1B = Γ2A = Γ2B = Γ = ψ(a− cR − cP ) (58)
Replacing (58) into (38)-(41), tax rates simplify to (12)-(13). Q.E.D.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume c1A = c1B = c2A = c2B = cR, cA = cB = cP , and asymmetric demands with a2 ≥ a1.
The functions Γ1A to Γ2B defined in (28)-(31) simplify to
Γ1A = Γ1B = αa1 − βa2 − ψ(cR + cP ) (59)
Γ2A = Γ2B = αa2 − βa1 − ψ(cR + cP ) (60)
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Replacing these values into (38)-(41), rates under full taxation can be written as functions of
a1, a2 and cR + cP . Equations (42)-(45) simplify to
t1 = w
t
a1a1 − w
t
a2a2 −w
t
RP (cR + cP )
τ1 = w
τ
a1a1 + w
τ
a2a2 −w
τ
RP (cR + cP )
t2 = −w
t
a2a1 +w
t
a1a2 −w
t
RP (cR + cP )
τ2 = w
τ
a2a1 + w
τ
a1a2 −w
τ
RP (cR + cP )
where (wta1, w
t
a2, w
t
RP , w
τ
a1, w
τ
a2, w
τ
RP) are positive-value functions of γ.
First, notice that the rate t1 decreases in a2 and may become negative as a2 grows large. In
the full tax solution, given that t2 increases in a2, it becomes clear that t2 > t1 for all γ in the
asymmetric-demand case when a2 > a1. Also, τ1 and τ2 grow with a2, and it can be checked
that wτa1(γ) > w
τ
a2(γ) and then τ1 > τ2 for all γ.
For high values of a2, t1 = 0 and the solution corresponds to partial taxation. The threshold for
t1 = 0 is obtained as follows. Let ΥI = w
t
RP/w
t
a2 and ΩI = w
t
a1/w
t
a2, and take (cR + cP )/a1 as
given. The cutoff value of a2/a1 for t1 = 0 can be written as
a2
a1
(γ) = ΩI(γ)−ΥI(γ)
(cR+ cP )
a1
(61)
Equation (61) is depicted in Figure 4 (dashed line). It is such that ΥI (0) = 54/61 ' 0.89,
ΩI(0) = 115/61 ' 1.89, and
a
2
a1
(γ) increases as γ → ∞. (This function is always below the
dotted line, that delimitates the ruled-out parameters area.)
When parameters are such that a2
a1
>
a
2
a1
(γ), and provided that there is a solution (see below),
t1 = 0 and the other three rates can be obtained from (46)-(48), as follows
τ1 = w
τ1
a1a1 + w
τ1
a2a2 −w
τ1
RP (cR + cP )
t2 = −w
t2
a1a1 +w
t2
a2a2 −w
t2
RP (cR + cP )
τ2 = w
τ2
a1a1 + w
τ2
a2a2 −w
τ2
RP (cR + cP )
where (wt2a1, w
t2
a2, w
t2
RP , w
τ1
a1, w
τ1
a2, w
τ1
RP , w
τ2
a1, w
τ2
a2, w
τ2
RP ) are positive-value functions of γ. Again, it
can be checked that wτ2a1(γ) > w
τ2
a2(γ) and then τ1 > τ2 for all γ.
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Second, asymmetries in market sizes and tax rates may render negative markups. After
examination of all cases, the relevant markup that may become negative is m1A = p1A − pA −
t1 − c1A. Intuitively, (i) the asymmetry is such that a2/a1 ≥ 1 and the candidate markets that
may become unprofitable are the retail markets in province 1, and (ii) the tax-mix in province
1 shifts away from retail (t1) to wholesale (τ1), making product A more costly.
Introducing the tax rates (the four positive tax rates in the full-tax case or t1 = 0 and the
remaining rates in the partial-tax case) into m1A, we look for the threshold a2/a1 such the
markup is zero:
a¯2
a1
(γ) =
αI1
βI1
−
ψI1
βI1
(cR + cP )
a1
if
a2
a1
≤
a2
a1
(γ) (62)
=
αI2
βI2
−
ψI2
βI2
(cR + cP )
a1
if
a2
a1
>
a2
a1
(γ)
where
αI1 =
1− δ
2 + γ
− (1− α− δ)wta1− (δ − β)w
t
a2 − (ω − ρ)w
τ
a1+ (σ − θ)w
τ
a2
βI1 =
δ
2 + γ
− (1− α− δ)wta2− (δ − β)w
t
a1 + (ω − ρ)w
τ
a2− (σ − θ)w
τ
a1
ψI1 =
1− 2δ
2 + γ
− (1− ψ − 2δ)wtRP − (ω − ρ− σ + θ)w
τ
RP
αI2 =
1− δ
2 + γ
− (δ − β)wt2a1 − (ω − ρ)w
τ1
a1 + (σ − θ)w
τ2
a1
βI2 =
δ
2 + γ
− (δ − β)wt2a2 + (ω − ρ)w
τ1
a2 − (σ − θ)w
τ2
a2
ψI2 =
1− 2δ
2 + γ
+ (δ − β)wt2RP − (ω − ρ)w
τ1
RP + (σ − θ)w
τ2
RP
Equation (62) is depicted in Figure 4 (solid line). In the region with t1 = 0 it is such that
αI2
βI2
(0) = 3715 ,
ψI2
βI2
(0) = 2215 , and
a¯2
a1
(γ) increases in γ but crossing
a
2
a1
(γ) at γa2 ' 6.57. At this
point, it switches (continuously) to the function corresponding to the region with positive tax
rates. Q.E.D.
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B.3 Proof of proposition 3
Assume a1 = a2 = a, cA = cB = cP , c1A = c1B = c1, c2A = c2B = c2 and let c1 ≥ c2. The
functions Γ1A to Γ2B defined in (28)-(31) simplify to
Γ1A = Γ1B = ψ(a− cP )− αc1 + βc2 (63)
Γ2A = Γ2B = ψ(a− cP )− αc2 + βc1 (64)
Replacing these values into (38)-(41), tax rates can be written as functions of a− cP , c1 and c2.
Equations (42)-(45) simplify to
t1 = w
t
aP (a− cP )−w
t
c1c1 + w
t
c2c2
τ1 = w
τ
aP (a− cP )−w
τ
c1c1 − w
τ
c2c2
t2 = w
t
aP (a− cP ) +w
t
c2c1 − w
t
c1c2
τ2 = w
τ
aP (a− cP )−w
τ
c2c1 − w
τ
c1c2
where (wtaP , w
τ
aP , w
t
c1, w
τ
c1, w
t
c2, w
τ
c2) are positive-valued functions of γ.
First, notice that t1, τ1 and τ2 can become negative if c1 is large enough. For high values of
c1, t1 = 0 and the solution corresponds to partial taxation. The threshold for t1 = 0 is obtained
as follows. Let ΥII = w
t
aP/w
t
c1 and ΩII = w
t
c2/w
t
c1, and take (a − cP )/c2 as given. The cutoff
value for c1/c2 can be written as
c1
c2
(γ) = ΥII(γ)
(a− cP )
c2
+ ΩII(γ) (65)
Equation (65) is depicted in Figure 5 (dashed line). It is such that ΥII(0) = 54/115 ' 0.47,
ΩII(0) = 61/115 ' 0.53, and
c
1
c2
(γ) increases converging to the dotted line (that delimitates the
ruled-out parameters area).
Repeating the same procedure for τ1 and τ2 the function equivalent to (65), i.e, that separates
the positive-rate area from the zero-rate area, lies over the dotted line in Figure 5 in both cases,
which is ruled out: hence, τ1 > 0 and τ2 > 0 for all relevant parameters. Finally, since t2
increases in c1 there is no possibility of a negative rate as c1 grows large. This condition is also
helpful to prove that t2 > t1. Also, it can be shown that w
τ
c1 < w
τ
c2, and hence τ1 > τ2.
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When parameters lie between (65) and the dotted line in Figure 5, t1 = 0 and the other three
rates can be obtained from (46)-(48), as follows
τ1 = w
τ1
aP (a− cP )− w
τ1
c1 c1 − w
τ1
c2 c2
t2 = w
t2
aP (a− cP ) + w
t2
c1c1 −w
t2
c2c2
τ2 = w
τ2
aP (a− cP )− w
τ2
c1 c1 − w
τ2
c2 c2
where (wτ1aP , w
τ1
c1 , w
τ1
c2 , w
t2
aP , w
t2
c1, w
t2
c2, w
τ2
aP , w
τ2
c1 , w
τ2
c2 ) are positive-valued functions of γ. An in-
spection of these equations raises the possibility that τ1 and τ2 may become negative if c1 is
large enough, for all γ. Again, finding the cutoff value for c1/c2, both for τ1 and τ2 reveals that
function equivalent to (65), that separates the positive-rate area from the zero-rate area of the
corresponding rate, lies over the dotted line in Figure 5 and is ruled out. Finally, it can be
shown that wτ1c1 − w
τ1
c2 < w
τ2
c1 −w
τ2
c2 and hence τ1 > τ2 within this region.
Second, asymmetries in retail cost by province and tax rates may render negative markups.
After examination of all cases, the relevant mark up that may became negative is m1A =
p1A − pA − t1 − c1A. Intuitively, (i) the asymmetry is such that c1/c2 > 1 and the candidate
markets that may become unprofitable are the retail markets in province 1, and (ii) province 1
diminishes t1 (to eventually 0) and increases τ1 (affecting good A through τ1 more than province
2 affects product B through τ2).
Introducing the tax rates (the four positive tax rates in the full-tax case or t1 = 0 and the
remaining rates in the partial-tax case) into m1A, we look for the threshold c1/c2 such the
markup is zero:
c¯1
c2
(γ) =
αII1
βII1
+
ψII1
βII1
(a− cP )
c2
if
c1
c2
≤
c1
c2
(γ) (66)
=
αII2
βII2
+
ψII2
βII2
(a− cP )
c2
if
c1
c2
>
c1
c2
(γ)
where
ψII1 =
1− 2δ
2 + γ
− (1− ψ − 2δ)wtaP − (ω − ρ− σ + θ)w
τ
aP
βII1 =
1− δ
2 + γ
− (1− α− δ)wtc1 − (δ − β)w
t
c2 − (ω − ρ)w
τ
c1+ (σ − θ)w
τ
c2
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αII1 =
δ
2 + γ
− (1− α− δ)wtc2 − (δ − β)w
t
c1 + (ω − ρ)w
τ
c2− (σ − θ)w
τ
c1
ψII2 =
1− 2δ
2 + γ
+ (δ − β)wt2aP − (ω − ρ)w
τ1
aP + (σ − θ)w
τ2
aP
βII2 =
1− δ
2 + γ
− (δ − β)wt2c1 − (ω − ρ)w
τ1
c1 + (σ − θ)w
τ2
c1
αII2 =
δ
2 + γ
− (δ − β)wt2c2 + (ω − ρ)w
τ1
c2 − (σ − ω)w
τ2
c2
Equation (66) is depicted in Figure 5 (solid line). In the region with t1 = 0 it is such that
αII2
βII2
(0) = 1537 ,
ψII2
βII2
(0) = 2237 , and
c¯1
c2
(γ) increases in γ but crossing
c
1
c2
(γ) at γc2 ' 6.57. At this
point, it switches (continuously) to the function corresponding to the region with positive tax
rates. Q.E.D.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Assume a1 = a2 = a, c1A = c1B = c2A = c2B = cR and let cA > cB. The functions Γ1A to Γ2B
defined in (28)-(31) simplify to
Γ1A = Γ1B = ψ(a− cR)−
(1 + γ)
(2 + γ)
(
ω +
κ
ψ
)
cA +
(1 + γ)
(2 + γ)
(2 + 3γ) + γ(1+ γ)
(2 + 3γ)
θcB (67)
Γ2A = Γ2B = ψ(a− cR)−
(1 + γ)
(2 + γ)
(
ω +
κ
ψ
)
cB +
(1 + γ)
(2 + γ)
(2 + 3γ) + γ(1+ γ)
(2 + 3γ)
θcA (68)
Replacing these values into (38)-(41), tax rates can be written as functions of a − cR, cA and
cB. Equations (42)-(45) simplify to
t1 = w
t
aR(a− cR)−w
t
ABcA +w
t
BAcB
τ1 = w
τ
aR(a− cR)−w
τ
ABcA −w
τ
BAcB
t2 = w
t
aR(a− cR) +w
t
BAcA −w
t
ABcB
τ2 = w
τ
aR(a− cR)−w
τ
BAcA −w
τ
ABcB
where (wtaR, w
τ
aR, w
t
AB, w
t
BA, w
τ
AB, w
τ
BA) are positive functions of γ. The term w
τ
AB is positive
for γ < γAB (where γAB ' 10) and negative otherwise, and always less than w
τ
BA.
First, notice that rates t1 and τ2 decrease in cA and may become negative if cA is large
enough for all γ, while τ1 may become negative if cA is large enough, for low γ. Rate t2 increases
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in cA and hence t2 > t1. Also, w
τ
AB(γ) > w
τ
BA(γ) and hence τ1 > τ2 for all γ. Moreover, τ1
decreases (increases) in cA for γ < (>)γAB.
For high values of cA, t1 = 0 and the solution corresponds to partial taxation. The threshold for
t1 = 0 is obtained as follows. Let ΥIII = w
t
aR/w
t
AB, ΩIII = w
t
BA/w
t
AB, and take (a− cR)/cB as
given. The cutoff value of cA/cB for t1 = 0 can be written as s
cA
cB
(γ) = ΥIII(γ)
(a− cR)
cB
+ ΩIII(γ) (69)
Equation (69) is depicted in Figure 6 (dashed line). It is such that ΥIII (0) = 54/71 ' 0.76,
ΩIII(0) = 17/71 ' 0.24 and
c
A
cB
(γ) decreases to 1 as γ →∞. (The function is always below the
dotted line, that delimitates the rule-out parameters area.)
Repeating the same procedure for τ2, the function equivalent to (69), that separates the positive-
rate area from the zero-rate area, lies over (69) and is ruled out: hence, τ2 > 0 for all relevant
parameters. Finally, repeating the same procedure for τ1 and γ ∈ [0, 10] leads to the same
conclusion, and τ1 > 0 for all relevant parameters.
Second, asymmetries in producer costs and tax rates may render negative markups. After
examination of all cases, the relevant markup that may become negative is m2A = p2A − pA −
t2 − c2A. Intuitively, (i) the asymmetry is such that cA/cB > 1 and the candidate markets that
may become unprofitable are the retail A markets, and (ii) the tax-mix is such that τ1 > τ2
(upstream tax relatively higher in the region that produces good A) and t2 > t1 (downstream
tax relatively higher in region 2).12
Introducing the tax rates from the full-tax solution into m2A, we look for the threshold cA/cB
such that the markup is zero:
c¯A
cB
(γ) =
αIII
βIII
+
ψIII
βIII
(a− cR)
cB
(70)
where
ψIII =
1− 2δ
2 + γ
− (1− ψ − 2δ)wtaR− (ω − ρ− σ + θ)w
τ
aR
12 The fact that τ1 > τ2 should not be confused with the idea of upstream taxing the product that
costs more. Indeed, τ1 decreases in cA for low and intermediate values of γ, and slightly increases for
high values of γ. At some point province 1 decreases t1 and slightly increases τ1 when a2 increases;
but remember that there is not much room for upstream taxation when products are homogeneous (see
explanations in Proposition 1).
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βIII =
[(2 + 3γ) + γ(1 + γ)]ω − γ(1+ γ)θ
(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
+ (1− α− δ)wtBA+ (δ − β)w
t
AB − (ω − ρ)w
τ
AB + (σ − θ)w
τ
BA
αIII =
γ(1 + γ)ω
2(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
+ (1− α− δ)wtAB + (δ − β)w
t
BA + (ω − ρ)w
τ
BA− (σ − θ)w
τ
AB
Equation (70) is depicted in Figure 6 (solid line). It is such that αIIIβIII (0) =
4
7 ,
ψIII
βIII
(0) = 37 ,
c¯A
cB
(γ)
decreases in γ and c¯A
cB
(γ) <
c
A
cB
(γ) for all γ. This last condition rules out cases with zero-tax
rate and non-negative markup m2A. Q.E.D.
B.5 Proof of proposition 5
Assume a1 = a2 = a, cA = cB = cP , c1A = c2A = cRA, c1B = c2B = cRB and let cRA ≥ cRB.
The functions Γ1A to Γ2B defined in (28)-(31) simplify to
Γ1A = Γ2A = ψ(a− cP )− (ψ + κ)cRA + κcRB (71)
Γ1B = Γ2B = ψ(a− cP )− (ψ + κ)cRB + κcRA (72)
Replacing these values into (38)-(41), tax rates can be written as functions of a− cP , cRA and
cRB. Equations (42)-(45) simplify to
t1 = w
t
aP (a− cP )− w
t
RARBcRA − w
t
RBRAcRB
τ1 = w
τ
aP (a− cP )− w
τ
RARBcRA + w
τ
RBRAcRB
t2 = w
t
aP (a− cP )− w
t
RBRAcRA − w
t
RARBcRB
τ2 = w
τ
aP (a− cP ) + w
τ
RBRAcRA − w
τ
RARBcRB
where (wtaP , w
τ
aP , w
t
RARB, w
τ
RARB, w
t
RBRA, w
τ
RBRA) are positive-valued functions of γ.
First, notice that t1, t2 and τ1 may become negative as cRA grows large. For high values
of cRA, τ1 = 0 and the solution corresponds to partial taxation. The threshold for τ1 = 0 is
obtained as follows. Let ΥIV = w
τ
aP/w
τ
RBRA and ΩIV = w
τ
RARB/w
τ
RBRA, and take (a−cP )/cRB
as given. The cutoff value for cRA/cRB can be written as
cRA
cRB
(γ) = ΥIV (γ)
(a− cP )
cRB
+ΩIV (γ) (73)
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Equation 73 is depicted in Figure 7 (dashed line). It is such that ΥIV (0) = 108/133 ' 0.81,
ΩIV (0) = 25/133 ' 0.19and
c
RA
cRB
(γ) decreases to 1 as γ →∞.
Repeating the same procedure for t1 and t2 the function equivalent to (73), i.e, that separates
the full-tax solution from the partial-tax solution, lies over the dotted line of Figure 7 (i.e.,
within the area of ruled-out parameters) in both cases, and is ruled out: hence, t1 > 0 and
t2 > 0 for all relevant parameters. Finally, since τ2 increases in cRA there is no possibility of
a negative rate as cRA grows large; moreover, this also proves that τ2 > τ1. Finally, it can be
shown that wtRARB < w
t
RBRA and hence t1 > t2.
When parameters lie between (73) and the dotted-line of Figure 7, τ1 = 0 and the other three
rates can be obtained from (52)-(54), as follows
t1 = w
t1
aP (a− cP )− w
t1
RAcRA −w
t1
RBcRB
t2 = w
t2
cP (a− cP )−w
t2
RAcRA − w
t2
RBcRB
τ2 = w
τ2
aP (a− cP ) + w
τ2
RAcRA −w
τ2
RBcRB
where (wt1aP , w
t1
RA, w
t1
RB, w
t2
aP , w
t2
RA, w
t2
RB, w
τ2
aP , w
τ2
RA, w
τ2
RB) are positive-valued functions of γ. An
inspection of these equations raises the possibility that t1 and t2 can become negative if cRA is
large enough, for all γ. Again, finding the cutoff value for cRA/cRB, both for t1 and t2 reveals
that function equivalent to (73), that separates the positive-rate area from the zero-rate area of
the corresponding rate, lies over the dotted-line of Figure 7 and is ruled out. Finally, it can be
seen that wt1RA − w
t1
RB < w
t2
RA −w
t2
RB and hence t1 > t2 within this region.
Second, asymmetries in retail costs by product and tax rates may render negative mark
ups. After examination of all cases, the relevant mark up that may become negative is m1A =
p1A − pA − t1 − c1Ain the case with t1 = 0 (since the threshold with full-tax lies over the
function (74) explained below). Intuitively, (i) the asymmetry is such that cRA/cRB > 1 and the
candidate markets that may become unprofitable are the retail markets of product A, and (ii)
province 1 only collects through t1 while province 2 collects through (t2, τ2) in a more balanced
way.
Introducing the tax rates (τ1 = 0 and the remaining positive rates) into m1A, we look for the
threshold cRA/cRB such the mark up is zero.
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c¯RA
cRB
(γ) = min
{
αIV
βIV
+
ψIV
βIV
(a− cP )
cRB
,
κ
ψ + κ
+
ψ
ψ + κ
(a− cP )
cRB
}
(74)
where
ψIV =
1− δ
2 + γ
− (1− α − δ)wt1aP + (δ − β)w
t2
aP + (σ − θ)w
τ2
aP
βIV =
[(2 + 3γ) + γ(1+ γ)](1− 2δ)
(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
−
[(2 + 3γ) + 2γ(1+ γ)]θ
(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
−(1− α− δ)wt1RA + (δ − β)w
t2
RA− (σ − θ)w
τ2
RA
αIV =
γ(1 + γ)(1− 2δ)
(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
−
[(2 + 3γ) + 2γ(1 + γ)]θ
(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
+ (1− α− δ)wt1RB − (δ − β)w
t2
RB − (σ − θ)w
τ2
RB
Equation (74) is depicted in Figure 7 (solid line). For low values of γ it is αIV
βIV
+ ψIV
βIV
(a−cP )
cRB
, such
that αIV
βIV
(0) = 27163 ,
ψIV
βIV
(0) = 136163 , and decreases in γ but crossing the function
κ
ψ+κ +
ψ
ψ+κ
(a−cP )
cRB
(which is the functional form of the dotted line) at γ ' 8.56. Q.E.D.
C Miscellaneous
C.1 Solution for cooperative taxation
This section of the Appendix proposes a solution, out of the infinite solutions that satisfy (18)-
(20). It works provided that asymmetries are not too large, which is fine because the cases
analyzed in Section 4 rule out large asymmetries. Depending on the combinations between (19)
and (20) there are four possible cases:
• Case 1: Γ1A + Γ1B − Γ2A − Γ2B ≥ 0 and Γ1A + Γ2A − Γ1B − Γ2B ≥ 0. In this case we
propose
t2 = τ2 =
Γ1A
16
(
1
ψ −
1
α+β −
1
µ+κ
)
+ Γ1B16
(
1
ψ −
1
α+β +
1
µ+κ
)
+
Γ2A
16
(
1
ψ
+ 1
α+β −
1
µ+κ
)
+ Γ2B16
(
1
ψ
+ 1
α+β +
1
µ+κ
)
t1 = t2 +
Γ1A + Γ1B − Γ2A − Γ2B
4(α+ β)
τ1 = τ2 +
Γ1A + Γ2A − Γ1B − Γ2B
4(µ+ κ)
• Case 2: Γ1A + Γ1B − Γ2A − Γ2B < 0 and Γ1A + Γ2A − Γ1B − Γ2B ≥ 0. In this case we
propose
t1 = τ2 =
Γ1A
16
(
1
ψ +
1
α+β −
1
µ+κ
)
+ Γ1B16
(
1
ψ +
1
α+β +
1
µ+κ
)
+
Γ2A
16
(
1
ψ −
1
α+β −
1
µ+κ
)
+ Γ2B16
(
1
ψ −
1
α+β +
1
µ+κ
)
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t2 = t1 +
Γ2A + Γ2B − Γ1A − Γ1B
4(α+ β)
τ1 = τ2 +
Γ1A + Γ2A − Γ1B − Γ2B
4(µ+ κ)
• Case 3: Γ1A + Γ1B − Γ2A − Γ2B ≥ 0 and Γ1A + Γ2A − Γ1B − Γ2B < 0. In this case we
propose
t2 = τ1 =
Γ1A
16
(
1
ψ −
1
α+β +
1
µ+κ
)
+ Γ1B16
(
1
ψ −
1
α+β −
1
µ+κ
)
+
Γ2A
16
(
1
ψ
+ 1
α+β +
1
µ+κ
)
+ Γ2B16
(
1
ψ
+ 1
α+β −
1
µ+κ
)
t1 = t2 +
Γ1A + Γ1B − Γ2A − Γ2B
4(α+ β)
τ2 = τ1 +
Γ1B + Γ2B − Γ1A − Γ2A
4(µ+ κ)
• Case 4: Γ1A + Γ1B − Γ2A − Γ2B > 0 and Γ1A + Γ2A − Γ1B − Γ2B < 0. In this case we
propose
t1 = τ1 =
Γ1A
16
(
1
ψ
+ 1
α+β +
1
µ+κ
)
+ Γ1B16
(
1
ψ
+ 1
α+β −
1
µ+κ
)
+
Γ2A
16
(
1
ψ
− 1
α+β +
1
µ+κ
)
+ Γ2B16
(
1
ψ
− 1
α+β −
1
µ+κ
)
t2 = t1 +
Γ2A + Γ2B − Γ1A − Γ1B
4(α+ β)
τ2 = τ1 +
Γ1B + Γ2B − Γ1A − Γ2A
4(µ+ κ)
C.2 Retail mark ups
Proofs to Propositions 2 to 3 use a condition that rules out negative retail mark ups. Specifically,
given the proposed asymmetries, the non-negativity conditions must be checked on either m1A
or m2A. Using the definition of prices from equations (3), (6) and (7), mark ups are
m1A = p1A − c1A − t1 − pA
= Ψ1A −ΦA − c1A − (1− α − δ)t1 + (δ − β)t2 − (ω − ρ)τ1 + (σ − θ)τ2
and
m2A = p2A − c2A − t2 − pA
= Ψ2A −ΦA − c2A − (1− α − δ)t2 + (δ − β)t1 − (ω − ρ)τ1 + (σ − θ)τ2
Mark up m1A is used in proofs to Propositions 2 (Appendix B.2), 5 (Appendix B.5) and 3
(Appendix B.3).
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- When c1A = c1B = c2A = c2B = cR, cA = cB = cP , and a2 ≥ a1,
ΦA = ΦB = Φ = δ(a1 + a2)− 2δcR + (1− 2δ)cP
Ψ1A =
a1
(2 + γ)
+
(1 + γ)
(2 + γ)
(Φ + cR)
Ψ1A − ΦA − c1A =
(1− δ)
(2 + γ)
a1 −
δ
(2 + γ)
a2 −
(1− 2δ)
(2 + γ)
(cP + cR) (75)
- When a1 = a2 = a, cA = cB = cP , c1A = c2A = cRA, c1B = c2B = cRB and cRA ≥ cRB,
Ψ1A − ΦA − c1A = ωaP (a− cP )− ωRAcRA + ωRBcRB
where
ωaP =
1− 2δ
2 + γ
> 0
ωRA =
[(2 + 3γ) + γ(1 + γ)](1− 2δ)
(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
−
[(2 + 3γ) + 2γ(1+ γ)]θ
(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
> 0
ωRB =
γ(1+ γ)(1− 2δ)
(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
−
[(2 + 3γ) + 2γ(1+ γ)]θ
(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
> 0
- When a1 = a2 = a, cA = cB = cP , c1A = c1B = c1, c2A = c2B = c2 and c1 ≥ c2,
Ψ1A −ΦA − c1A =
(1− 2δ)
(2 + γ)
(a− cP )−
(1− δ)
(2 + γ)
c1 +
δ
(2 + γ)
c2
Mark up m2A is used in proof to Proposition 4 (Appendix B.4).
- When a1 = a2 = a, c1A = c1B = c2A = c2B = cR and let cA > cB.
ΦA = 2δ (a− cR) + ωcA + θcB
ΦB = 2δ (a− cR) + θcA + ωcB
Ψ2A =
a+ (1 + γ)cR
(2 + γ)
+
(1 + γ) [2(1 + γ)ΦA+ γΦB]
(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
Ψ2A −ΦA − cR = ωaR(a− cR)− ωAcA + ωBcB
where
ωaR =
1− 2δ
2 + γ
> 0
ωA =
[(2 + 3γ) + γ(1+ γ)]ω − γ(1 + γ)θ
(2 + γ)(2 + 3γ)
> 0
ωB =
γ(1+ γ)ω
2(2 + γ)(2+ 3γ)
> 0
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